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In Philadelphia, the Annenberg Challenge was
known as Children Achieving and was a
districtwide systemic reform initiative designed
and led by a small core group of District officials
and external partners. This report examines the
Children Achieving Challenge and the strategies
the designers employed to improve teaching and
learning in the public schools. Among the condi-
tions associated with the Annenberg Challenge
were requirements that two matching dollars be
raised for each one received from the Annenberg
Foundation and that an independent manage-
ment structure be created to provide program,
fiscal, and evaluation oversight of the grant. In
Philadelphia, a business organization, Greater
Philadelphia First, assumed these responsibilities,
and with them, the challenge of working with the
School District to build and sustain civic support
for the improvement of the public schools. 
The story of Children Achieving provides an
opportunity to examine the dynamics and effects
of systemic reform in a large urban district. The
theory of systemic reform seems straightforward.
It holds that if districts and states set academic
standards for student performance; align
curriculum, instruction, and assessment with these
standards; measure students’ progress; and offer
rewards or sanctions to educators based on
performance, then school staffs will make the
changes in their practice necessary to ensure that
students achieve at high levels. From 1996 to
2002, the Consortium for Policy Research in
Education (CPRE) and Research for Action (RFA)
served as the evaluators of the Challenge in
Philadelphia and observed this theory being put
into practice. CPRE and RFA staff collected data
from hundreds of Philadelphia schools, observed
classrooms, and interviewed teachers, principals,
and other school officials. The District’s test
scores and other indicators of performance were
analyzed, as were the results of two districtwide
surveys of teachers. From the analysis of this
data, we have drawn some lessons that should
inform educational reform in our large cities. 
This report summarizes those lessons and draws
on findings published in previous reports from
CPRE and RFA to provide an overall assessment
of the reforms undertaken in Philadelphia in the
1990s. (See Appendix A for a list of other
reports). Information on research methods and
sources of data are in Appendix B. The report is
organized around the eight core strategies of the
reform and the rationale, design, implementation,
and effectiveness of each strategy are discussed.
The report concludes with some lessons drawn
from the Philadelphia experience. 
About this Report
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Children Achieving Challenge Timeline
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
January – Curriculum frameworks
for English/language arts, mathe-
matics, science, and social studies
distributed to all schools; graduation
and promotion requirements identi-
fied.
February – Hornbeck threatens to
adopt an unbalanced budget if the
state does not provide needed funds,
which could lead to the schools
closing before the end of the school
year.
March – District, city, and other
officials and interest groups file a
federal civil-rights suit against the
state, contending that the state’s
funding practices discriminate
against school districts with large
numbers of non-White students. 
April – State legislature responds
by passing Act 46, a state takeover
law aimed specifically at
Philadelphia.
May – City Council adopts School
District budget, relying on letters of
credits from banks to avert an early
school closure in the 1998-1999
school year.
February – Mayor Rendell, City
Council President Street, Super-
intendent Hornbeck, School Board
members, and community leaders
issue Realities Converge: This
Year is Different. The authors
promised a zero-growth School
District budget but “drew a line in
the sand” and refused to cut any
more school-based programs.
District, city, and community leaders
file lawsuit against the state
contending that Pennsylvania does
not provide a “thorough and
efficient” education. 
July – Standards in final three
subjects adopted by School Board.
September – Professional Respon-
sibility Index scores made public for
the first time. This marks the first
reporting period of the first two-
year accountability cycle (measuring
progress from 1996-1998). 
April - May – SAT-9 administered
districtwide in grades 2, 4, 6, 8, and
11.
September – All 22 clusters estab-
lished. Standards Curriculum
Resource Guides distributed to
teachers.
December – Standards in
reading/English/language arts,
science, mathematics, and the arts
adopted by School Board.
February – Philadelphia receives a
$50 million Annenberg Challenge
grant, which is matched by $100
million from Philadelphia corpora-
tions, foundations, and federal
grants. 
May – Five months after taking
office, Governor Ridge proposes a
statewide voucher plan. This is the
first of Ridge’s three attempts to
establish a statewide voucher
program, none of which were able
to garner needed legislative
support.
December – Standards Writing
Teams, composed of parents,
teachers, and community members,
are convened; writing of new
academic standards begins.
August – David Hornbeck
appointed Superintendent of
Philadelphia schools.
October – Philadelphia Inquirer
publishes “District in Distress,” its
first report card on the state of
Philadelphia public schools,
including information on poverty
rates, dropout rates, teachers’
salaries, and student performance
on the SAT-9.
November – As part of a desegre-
gation case against the district,
Judge Doris Smith orders the
School District to submit a plan for
reducing racial disparities in student
achievement. 
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1999
2000
2001
May - District’s 22 clusters are
replaced by eight academic offices
in a cost cutting effort. School
Board adopts a budget with $216
million deficit creating a new fiscal
crisis with state takeover of the
District possible.
July – Mayor Street and Governor
Ridge sign a Memorandum of
Understanding giving the Governor
the right to commission an analysis
of the District’s financial and educa-
tional situation. Ridge hires Edison
Schools to do the analysis.
October – Governor Ridge is
appointed to lead U.S. Office of
Homeland Security. Lt. Governor
Mark Schweiker replaces him. 
December – Philip Goldsmith
resigns as CEO of the District. State
executes a "friendly takeover". The
school board is replaced by a five-
member School Reform
Commission, with three members
appointed by the governor and two
by the mayor. Governor Schweiker
appoints James Nevels as the
interim chairman. Other four
members appointed in January.
January – Street selects a new
School Board, the first time this has
happened in the history of
Philadelphia and also appoints the
first Secretary of Education for the city,
Debra Kahn, who is charged with
leading the district’s team in negotia-
tion of a new teachers’ contract.
May – Pennsylvania Legislature
passes and Governor Ridge signs
the Education Empowerment Act, a
state reform and “takeover” bill
targeted at 11 school districts,
including Philadelphia, with high
student failure rates.
June – Threat of state takeover crisis
in the district during the Republican
Convention in Philadelphia is averted
by a financial settlement between the
School District and Governor Ridge.
Still facing a deficit, the School Board
cuts the budget and Hornbeck
resigns in protest.
August – Teacher contract expires,
beginning two months of tense
negotiating between the union and
the Board of Education. The
contract is settled before school is
disrupted with the intervention of
Mayor Street and pressure from
Governor Ridge, who threatens a
state takeover.
Board of Education announces
decision to adopt a corporate style
of management. Deidre Farmbry, a
veteran Philadelphia educator,
appointed Chief Academic Officer.
October – Philip Goldsmith, a
lawyer and journalist, appointed
interim Chief Executive Officer.
January – David Hornbeck’s
contract extended for two more
years.
March – School District presents
budget to City Council with projected
$94 million deficit for 1999-2000
school year; refuses to make further
cuts.
November – John Street is
elected Mayor. Philadelphians pass
a referendum to change the City
Charter to allow the Mayor to
appoint all members of the School
Board with terms concurrent to his
own.
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The Philadelphia School District has the daunting
responsibility of providing an effective education
to 215,000 students, most of whom live in
poverty and must cope with the stress and
problems associated with severe economic disad-
vantage. Eighty percent are children of color who
are also affected by the racial discrimination
directed at their families and communities. The
district faces challenges common to other urban
school districts — low achievement and high
dropout rates, inadequate funding, decaying
buildings, and high teacher and principal
turnover. This story is not new and these and
related problems have persisted for decades. The
Philadelphia Inquirer, in 1994, published a report
about the Philadelphia schools called “A District
in Distress” that outlined the grim realities in the
schools at that time: 
• Less than half of Philadelphia students
entering high school in 1989 graduated four
years later.
• Students in only 15 out of 171 elementary
schools scored at or above average on
nationally normed reading tests.
• Test scores were highly correlated with
poverty levels. 
• Philadelphia per-pupil funding was the lowest
in the area. 
In 1995, some hope arrived. Philadelphia was one
of 16 locations nationwide designated to receive
large grants through the Annenberg Challenge
program. Walter Annenberg, benefactor and
former Ambassador to Great Britain, announced
an unprecedented gift of $500 million for public
education in America and challenged cities
around the country to “speed the movement” of
educational reform initiatives. One condition of
the Annenberg Challenge was that each of the
grants, varying in amounts from $10 to $50
million, had to be matched two to one with
additional dollars raised by each city.
Philadelphia’s $50 million grant was successfully
matched with $100 million raised by Philadelphia
corporations and foundations, and federal grants. 
Arrival of Superintendent 
David Hornbeck
Immediately prior to the launch of the Annenberg
Challenge in Philadelphia, a new superintendent,
David Hornbeck, had been recruited by a coali-
tion of Philadelphia business, civic, and
government leaders. Hornbeck was an advocate
of systemic reform and had been one of the
architects of Kentucky’s Education Reform Act. He
believed that content and performance
standards, decentralization, and accountability
mechanisms should be used in concert to trans-
form entire school systems rather than seeking
improvement school-by-school. His theory of
action, as articulated to CPRE and RFA
researchers, summarizes Children Achieving’s
reform agenda:
Given high academic standards and strong incen-
tives to focus their efforts and resources; more
control over school resource allocations, organiza-
tion, policies, and programs; adequate funding
and resources; more hands-on leadership and
high-quality support; better coordination of
resources and programs; schools restructured to
support good teaching and encourage improve-
ment of practice; rich professional development
of their own choosing and increased public
understanding and support; the teachers and
administrators of the Philadelphia schools will
develop, adopt, or adapt instructional technolo-
gies and patterns of behavior that will help all
children reach the district’s high standards.
Philadelphia’s leaders welcomed Hornbeck’s
approach. They saw high standards and strong
accountability as a tonic for Philadelphia’s poorly
performing schools. New leadership with a
persuasive strategy combined with the award of
the Annenberg Challenge grant and the receipt
of the matching funds brought hope that
something would finally be done to turn the city’s
schools around.
Consortium for Policy Research in Education
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Background
To put his theory into practice in Philadelphia,
Hornbeck developed a 10-point plan that
outlined the steps the district would take to make
dramatic improvements in the Philadelphia
schools. Hornbeck believed that these strategies
would bring about dramatic improvement in 
Philadelphia. He set an ambitious goal of having
all students achieve at or above the standards in
12 years.These points were:
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1. Set high expectations for all students — so that every
child gets the “basics” and a lot more.
2. Set standards to measure the results of reforms and
use these measures to hold educators accountable.
3. Shrink the centralized bureaucracy and let schools make
more decisions.
4. Provide intensive and sustained training to staff so
they can meet the tough challenges ahead.
5. Make sure all students are healthy and ready to learn.
6. Provide students with the community support and
services they need to succeed in school.
7. Provide up-to-date technology: one computer for every six
students, books, and clean and safe schools.
8. Engage the public in understanding, supporting, and participating
in school reform. 
9. Ensure adequate financial and other resources, and
use them effectively.
10. Be prepared to address all these priorities together,
all at once, and for the long term — starting now. 
Consortium for Policy Research in Education
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We will never know if Children Achieving would
have produced the performance gains that
Hornbeck envisioned. Political and financial
problems brought Hornbeck’s tenure to an end in
the summer of 2000, and the Children Achieving
initiative essentially ended with his departure.
What we do know is that modest gains were
made in the first five years (See Figures 1, 2, and
3 for SAT-9 data). Based on the magnitude of
those gains and the trends appearing in the data,
it seems unlikely that the district would have
achieved the ambitious goal of having the
student population on average reach the
standards by 2007 or 2008. Nevertheless, gains
were made. Here we describe the progress made
at the elementary, middle, and high school levels.
The Children Achieving reformers did not initially
articulate distinct strategies for elementary,
middle, and high schools. The design was to a
large extent a one-size-fits-all approach. However,
there was some customizing of the design to
address issues unique to different levels of
schooling. At each level, the challenges of
motivating students and staff varied and different
supports were needed to make the changes. The
district’s focus on literacy in the early elementary
grades reaped significant benefits because
elementary teachers were provided with guidance
about how to implement research-based instruc-
tional practices in their classrooms and with the
materials and tools they needed to do the job.
But this kind of districtwide focus on instruction
was missing in the middle and high schools and
many of these schools floundered attempting to
design their own instructional interventions. 
Clearly, the issues faced by the high schools were
the most daunting. Faculty were asked to make
major changes in curriculum and instruction with
little guidance or support. They were asked to
take ill-prepared students to higher levels of
performance without being offered plausible
strategies for helping their students catch up.
They were asked to create small learning commu-
nities and introduce school-to-work programs,
service requirements, and senior projects at the
same time. All of this had to be done in large
schools in which many faculty members were
isolated and demoralized, and many were
strongly resistant to the reforms. Attention to
these issues might have helped high schools to
improve student achievement. The experience in
Philadelphia suggests that reform strategies must
be customized to address the issues at each level
of schooling to have a chance of success and
there must be strong guidance and support
about curriculum and instruction to produce
results. 
Nevertheless, some schools made significant
progress and they shared some common attrib-
utes regardless of grade level. Qualitative
research in 41 schools indicated that where there
were consistent improvements in instructional
practices and sustained gains in student achieve-
ment, there was strong school leadership focused
on instruction, a sense of professional community,
curriculum-based professional development, and
effective use of data including review of student
work. In many of these schools, parents were
accepted as partners in improving school
performance. While these factors were important
at all grade levels, these conditions were seen
more frequently in elementary schools than in
middle schools or high schools.
The Results of Reform
“…where there were consistent improvements in instructional practices
and sustained gains in student achievement, there was strong 
school leadership focused on instruction, a sense of professional
community, curriculum-based professional development, and effective
use of data including review of student work.”
Elementary Schools Show 
Real Gains
A critical mass of elementary schools made signif-
icant gains in student performance in reading as
measured by test scores, but there were not
comparable gains in mathematics. The strong
curricular focus on early literacy had a major
impact on student achievement as did the estab-
lishment of full-day kindergarten. In the
elementary schools, professional development
focused primarily on the literacy curriculum and
research-based teaching practices. And small
learning communities were built on the founda-
tion of the working relationships teachers had
established in grade-level groups. This helped
teachers to learn how to use the new materials
and practices associated with the balanced
literacy initiative as they were able to share their
ideas, struggles, and questions with their small
learning community colleagues. The literacy
initiative gave teachers in the small learning
communities a shared focus and purpose that in
turn strengthened professional community. The
result was continuous progress in improving
reading achievement. There was no comparable
district initiative in mathematics in the elementary
schools. Since elementary teachers often lack
adequate preparation to teach mathematics in
the first place, they could not be expected to
improve mathematics instruction on their own.
The lack of a coherent district strategy produced
a predictable result in most schools; there was
little improvement in mathematics achievement.
In mathematics at least, standards, incentives,
and decentralization were not sufficient to
generate performance gains. 
Middle Schools Offer 
a Mixed Story
Middle school students made modest gains on
the SAT-9. While eighth-graders made some
progress during the first three years, their scores
flattened in the fourth year, and their math and
science scores declined in year five. Mathematics
scores were especially low in the middle schools
as few teachers had strong mathematics
backgrounds and the mathematics curriculum was
not well aligned with the SAT-9.
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FIGURE 1. PERCENT OF STUDENTS SCORING AT OR ABOVE BASIC
IN MATH BY SCHOOL LEVEL, SAT-9, 1996-2000
Nevertheless, most middle school teachers felt
the Children Achieving reforms had positive
impacts on their schools. In fact, they were more
positive about the reforms than their counterparts
at the elementary and secondary levels. Faced
with an onslaught of demands from the central
office, middle school staff often chose to work on
those pieces of the reform with which they were
most comfortable. So they focused on the
creation of small learning communities (SLCs), the
development and implementation of thematic
curriculum, and test preparation. While well
intended, the thematic curricula developed by
middle school staff often lacked rigor and
distracted them from developing more rigorous
standards-based curricula. As has been discov-
ered by others, it proved difficult to build strong
interdisciplinary programs on a foundation of
weak disciplinary curriculum. 
Student discipline was a serious problem in
middle school classrooms, undermined attempts
to improve instruction, and contributed to high
teacher turnover. This combination of poor
student discipline and high teacher turnover
produced chaos in some schools. In the highest
poverty middle schools, 46 percent of the
teachers in the 1999-2000 school years were new
to their schools in the last two years. In the lowest
poverty middle schools the figure was 34
percent.1
High Schools Struggle 
High school students were performing poorly on
district tests at the beginning of Children
Achieving in 1996 and were still doing poorly five
years later. Test scores were flat during the first
few years of the reform and then edged up
slightly in the last three years. High school
teachers, facing huge gaps between the entering
achievement of their students and the district’s
performance expectations, also showed the least
support for the reform. The architects of the
reform lost a rich opportunity to increase teacher
buy-in and improve implementation when they
decided to ignore the teacher networks that had
been nurtured during the previous reform era.
Even highly committed high school teachers felt
excluded from the reform. Many high schools
lacked effective principals which only further
impeded the possibility of success. Academic
Consortium for Policy Research in Education
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FIGURE 2. PERCENT OF STUDENTS SCORING AT OR ABOVE BASIC
IN READING BY SCHOOL LEVEL, SAT-9, 1996-2000
departments were weak to begin with and were
eliminated in many high schools as school leaders
focused their resources on supporting SLCs. But
SLC coordinators were overwhelmed with admin-
istration and disciplinary responsibilities, and
could not fill the leadership vacuum. Thus, there
was inadequate instructional leadership and
teachers were left to cope as best they could. 
The improvements in achievement in Philadelphia
can be explained largely by intensive test prepa-
ration and increasing familiarity with the content
and format of the test. In fact, the pattern of early
gains in performance in the elementary and
middle schools follows a pattern seen in other
localities when new tests are introduced: scores
are suppressed initially and then rise for two or
three years before leveling off. This pattern raises
questions about the amount of change in
teaching and learning that actually occurred in
Philadelphia. 
Although the gains in student achievement were
modest, there was enormous celebration in the
district when the gains were announced each year
and a huge investment in telling this “good
news.” To show that progress was being made,
the district created categories of proficient, basic,
and below basic to differentiate levels of student
performance. However, because the initial level of
student performance was so low, leaders divided
the below-basic category into three sub-
categories to make student progress visible. It
was difficult for many civic leaders in Philadelphia
to feel that substantial progress was being made,
since even after five years, while some students
progressed, many remained in the below-basic
category. In addition, civic leaders’ expectations
had been raised and they expected progress to
come quickly and steadily. The reality of poor
performance belied the exuberant claims of
progress coming from the central office and
increased skepticism about Children Achieving’s
potential for success. 
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FIGURE 3. PERCENT OF STUDENTS SCORING AT OR ABOVE BASIC
IN SCIENCE BY SCHOOL LEVEL, SAT-9, 1996-2000
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Strategies of Reform within 
Children Achieving
Eight strategies served as prime movers within Children Achieving’s complicated
theory of action. Examining these strategies in retrospect, one can better under-
stand the problems that arose and the disconnects with the realities in the schools
that surfaced as Children Achieving was being implemented. It also becomes easier
to understand why its impact was limited. These eight key strategies were: 
1. Fair Funding 
Seek increased state funding and a new state funding formula that was fair to
Philadelphia’s schools. 
2. Standards
Set high standards to outline the knowledge and skills that Philadelphia
students should acquire.
3. Accountability
Create an accountability system to assess how schools perform annually and
reward progress or sanction decline every two years.
4. Decentralization
Move decision-making back to schools and neighborhoods by organizing
clusters of schools around high school feeder patterns, developing small
learning communities within schools, and creating local school councils. 
5. Leadership and Support
Prepare teachers and administrators to understand, support, and effectively
implement the reforms.
6. Better Coordination of Resources
Provide students with the social services and supports they need to succeed in
school.
7. Civic and Parent Engagement
Build support from citizens for the Children Achieving reforms and involve
parents as leaders and active participants in their children’s schools.
8. Doing It All At Once
Address all of the elements of Children Achieving at once in order to move
the system forward.
The Limits and Contradictions of Systemic Reform: 
The Philadelphia Story
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One tenet of the 10-point plan of Children
Achieving was to “ensure adequate financial and
other resources, and use them effectively.” While
this seemed like an obvious point, over the
course of the reform it became a source of aggra-
vation to some and a disappointment to many.
The struggle between state and city leaders over
the costs of adequately financing the schools and
the state’s responsibility for funding became a
primary point of contention and debate within
the city and overwhelmed discussions about the
progress of instructional reforms. 
When Children Achieving was launched in 1995,
Philadelphia’s population was shrinking, busines-
ses were leaving the city, and the number of jobs
in the city was declining. Consequently, the tax
base supporting city services, including the
schools, was shrinking. And local taxes were high.
Philadelphia residents were paying higher
property tax rates than residents in surrounding
counties and they were paying a city wage tax of
nearly four percent. The wage tax was a disincen-
tive to businesses that might consider moving into
the city and an obstacle to economic growth. In
this economic environment, it was hard to increase
local financial support for the public schools.
State support for the Philadelphia schools also
was declining. The state had frozen its funding
formula in 1993 and from that time onward, state
aid to Philadelphia did not increase in response
to increases in enrollment. On a per-pupil basis
adjusted for inflation, the value of state funds
coming to Philadelphia actually decreased by 5.9
percent between 1993-1998.
As a consequence, Philadelphia’s per-pupil
expenditures were significantly lower than those
in surrounding Pennsylvania school districts. In
the five-county region around the city, some
districts were spending twice as much per pupil
as Philadelphia. Average starting salaries for
teachers in the suburbs were more than $3,500
higher than those in Philadelphia and maximum
salaries were nearly $10,000 higher. As a conse-
quence, there was a steady stream of teachers
leaving the city for the suburbs.
So Philadelphia faced the task of educating the
state’s neediest children with resources that most
suburbanites would have regarded as wholly
inadequate for the provision of good public
schools. The only solution to the fiscal problems
of the district was increased state aid, but
persuading the legislature to alter the school
funding formula and increasing state taxes was a
difficult assignment in a large and conservative
state in which rural and suburban interests often
clashed with those of the cities.
The entire reform effort in Philadelphia can be
viewed as a calculated risk by Superintendent
Hornbeck that he could secure additional funds
for the district in time to sustain the reforms
before the Annenberg Challenge grant ran out.
He believed he could demonstrate the efficacy of
additional funding by raising test scores and
persuading either the courts or the legislature that
fiscal reforms were needed to provide equal
opportunity for Philadelphia’s children and that
they would result in improved performance.
Children Achieving’s leaders pursued multiple,
overlapping strategies to generate the political
will to obtain increased city and state funding for
Philadelphia public schools. One strategy was to
gain the endorsement of the city’s civic and
business leaders for the reform agenda through
their involvement in such groups as the
Annenberg Challenge coordinating and oversight
committees that developed the initial work plans.
A second was to show evidence of improved
student performance to prove that Children
Strategy One: Fair Funding
“The entire reform effort in Philadelphia can be viewed as a calculated
risk by Superintendent Hornbeck that he could secure additional funds
for the district in time to sustain the reforms before the 
Annenberg Challenge grant ran out.”
Achieving was a reform worthy of an increased
investment of state and local dollars. A third was
to make a convincing case that the district was
being well managed by cutting costs and
documenting what would be needed to maintain
student progress. A fourth strategy was to renego-
tiate the teachers’ contract to give management
more flexibility to address student needs and
increase labor productivity. A fifth strategy was to
catalyze and nurture grassroots organizing efforts,
and develop a strong group of parents willing to
fight for increased funding in the state capital. The
sixth strategy was to go to court. 
Each year, Superintendent Hornbeck delivered a
budget statement to Philadelphia’s City Council
that outlined the expenditures for the coming
year. With the budget documents for the 1997-
1998 school year, district leaders distributed a
white paper titled, “Realities Converge: This Year
is Different.” This paper set a new tone and raised
the political stakes. The paper outlined three legal
actions being taken against the state by the
district, the city, and other plaintiffs such as the
Philadelphia chapter of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People. The first
was a lawsuit filed in the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court that claimed the state had
violated its obligation under the state constitution
to provide a “thorough and efficient” education
for all children in Pennsylvania. The second was a
lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for
the Eastern Division of Pennsylvania charging the
state with violating federal civil-rights law by
shifting funding away from Philadelphia, the
district with the largest concentration of minority
students in the Commonwealth and “thereby
increasing their concentration and isolation both
within their school district and among students in
the Commonwealth.”2 The third action was to file
a brief in the State Supreme Court to support a
prior Commonwealth Court decision that the state
should pay the city extra funds to support court-
mandated desegregation remedies.
The language in the white paper was strong.
“The School District does not take these actions
lightly. Yet, Philadelphia’s children deserve better
treatment from the State…The State’s continued
denial of its basic constitutional responsibility
simply leaves no alternative. The indisputable fact
is that the Commonwealth has denied its moral
and constitutional mandate to provide a thorough
and efficient education to the City’s school
children…”3 In subsequent speeches, Hornbeck
pursued these themes expressing considerable
moral outrage. His implicit charges of racism
inflamed the governor and other state leaders
who found the claims outrageous. Battle lines
were drawn, and meaningful discussions between
district and state leaders ceased. 
The conflicts between state and city leaders over
the adequacy of the financing of the schools and
who should be responsible for funding
overwhelmed discussions about the progress of
instructional reform. Civic and business leaders
who were initially supportive of Children Achieving
because of its strong accountability system
became increasingly critical of Hornbeck’s
confrontational style which they saw as an inappro-
priate strategy for securing public support or state
cooperation.4 They were not eager to confront a
governor to whom they were looking for economic
support for business in the city, despite increasing
evidence that Pennsylvania lagged far behind
other states in its funding of public schools. (In
January 2001, Education Week gave Pennsylvania
a grade of “D-” on funding equity in comparison
to other states.) Moreover, the leadership of the
business community was changing and some of
the new leaders favored the governor’s voucher
proposal. In addition, as mentioned earlier, while
they saw modest gains on student test scores,
student performance remained extremely low in
the city and this seemed in conflict with the claims
made by Hornbeck that student performance was
greatly improved. 
The fair funding cause, ardently led by
Superintendent Hornbeck, became a primary focus
of the central staff and drained time and energy
from the hard work of improving teaching and
learning. In many ways, the funding and fiscal
issues were the Achilles Heel of the reform, the
point of vulnerability that took attention away from
the schools, and gave those opposed to Children
Achieving a way to reframe the issue from inade-
quate financial support for public education to
Hornbeck’s leadership style. 
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The architects of Children Achieving believed that
adopting written standards defining what
students should know and be able to do would
create a basis for assessing student performance;
serve as a guide for teachers, administrators, and
parents; and motivate all parties to improve their
work. The creation of standards was a significant
step for the Philadelphia school district — repre-
senting a change from accepting any growth in
achievement as adequate to striving for mastery.
The new standards, partially based on those
developed by national professional organizations,
established goals for the skills and knowledge
students should acquire by defining specific
benchmarks at grades 4, 8, and 10. But the
standards did not prescribe what material should
be taught or how it should be taught. This was
left to the teachers in each school who were
expected to establish a curriculum that would
prepare students to reach the standards. 
The process used to create the content standards
was inclusive and brought together teachers,
administrators, parents, principals, and commu-
nity members who served on committees that
met over several months before reaching final
consensus and ultimately presenting their work
for Board approval. As these groups worked
together, they learned much about efforts across
the country to promote standards-based educa-
tion and the implications of standards for school
and classroom practices. They became
committed to standards as an approach to
improving education, but the committees were
disbanded upon completion of the standards
documents and the district did not capitalize on
these groups’ new knowledge and enthusiasm by
using them as advocates and leaders in the
reform.
Standards were a major departure from the
previous administration’s standardized curriculum.
The previous district curriculum outlined the
specific topics to be taught at every grade level,
but did not specify expectations for what
students should know and be able to do. With
the adoption of standards, teachers were given
more latitude about what to teach and how to
teach it, but no latitude about the goals for
student learning. However, teachers varied widely
in their response to the district standards.5 Most
used the standards as they had the standardized
curriculum. Typically, they used them as check-
lists, checking off the topics covered, and saw
their relevance for the content of their courses,
but failed to see their implications for their
teaching practice or for student performance. 
Part of the problem with the implementation of
standards was timing. They were developed in
the spring of 1996 and distributed to teachers
that summer. The School Board adopted them
the following December. Since the new accounta-
bility system was already in place, teachers were
expected to implement the standards immedi-
ately. Yet no time had been allowed for review of
the standards, revision of curriculum, purchase of
new instructional materials, or preparation of
staff.
Most teachers found that the standards were not
specific enough to guide the development of
lessons and asked for more direction. In the
second year of the reform, this concern was
widespread. Teachers were frustrated by the lack
Consortium for Policy Research in Education
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Strategy Two: Standards
“...for teachers who had little or no exposure to local or national
initiatives promoting instructional reform or who doubted that their
students could achieve the standards, the curriculum frameworks 
were not enough… Their curriculum and instruction were 
heavily influenced by the district’s standardized test, the SAT-9. 
In their classrooms, narrow test preparation prevailed 
over the standards.”
of time to review and discuss the standards and
the lack of specificity about what was to be
taught at each grade level. They wanted more
specific examples and guidance so they could
understand how to put the standards into
practice in their classrooms. They needed help in
determining what materials were aligned with the
standards and time to make the necessary adjust-
ments in curriculum. 
In response to these concerns, district personnel
developed curriculum frameworks, which offered
more specific instructional activities and strategies
for all subjects by grade level. The curriculum
frameworks were intended to help teachers
understand what they needed to do to have their
students achieve the new standards. Although the
frameworks did not provide a curriculum, they did
identify constructivism as the pedagogical philos-
ophy underlying the district standards.6 They
offered examples of how to enact that philosophy
by providing sample activities and model units
that addressed the standards and defined grade-
specific skills. The frameworks did help some
teachers move toward standards-based instruc-
tion. However, many teachers complained that
the curriculum frameworks did not provide them
with adequate guidance. 
In fact, the frameworks did not offer recipes for
success. The recommended practices did not
always rest on solid empirical bases, but rather a
philosophy of instruction and a promise of better
outcomes. Moreover, they rested on tenuous
assumptions about teachers’ knowledge of
subject matter and pedagogical skills. And they
assumed that teachers were able to manage their
classrooms. Data from classroom observations
and teacher interviews indicated that competent
teachers who held high expectations for children
found the frameworks to be useful tools. They
helped teachers develop curriculum units, lesson
plans, and classroom-based assessments.
However, for teachers who had had little or no
exposure to local or national initiatives promoting
instructional reform or who doubted that their
students could achieve the standards, the
curriculum frameworks were not enough. Many of
these teachers were overwhelmed by classroom
management problems and by the complexity of
the changes suggested by the frameworks. Their
curriculum and instruction were heavily influenced
by the district’s standardized test, the SAT-9. In
their classrooms, narrow test preparation pre-
vailed over the standards.
Bridging the distance between where teachers
were — in their knowledge of subject matter,
their use of instructional practices, and their
beliefs about what students can learn (students
who came with tremendous deficits) — and where
they needed to be, in order to help their students
reach higher standards, proved to be a daunting
task in Philadelphia, as it has across the country. 
The Limits and Contradictions of Systemic Reform: 
The Philadelphia Story
12
A good accountability system allows the public to
see the progress being made in schools and
leads to accountability for district leaders as well
as teachers and students. It builds the capacity of
schools to become learning organizations by
providing multiple indicators that stimulate reflec-
tion and examination of practice, and mid-course
corrections. Children Achieving’s leaders created
an accountability system based on the
Performance Responsibility Index (PRI), a measure
that included several indicators of performance.
The index included math, reading, and science
scores of students on the SAT-9; promotions to
the next grade level in elementary and middle
schools; the proportion of ninth-grade students
graduating from high school in four years; and
student and teacher attendance. The system
operated on a two-year cycle, and the PRI
provided each school with biennial performance
targets. The goal was to motivate school staff to
take actions that would improve their results on
these indicators and raise their PRI score. Schools
were rewarded or sanctioned based on their
progress toward two accountability goals:
meeting or surpassing their PRI performance
target and decreasing the number of students
scoring at the lowest levels on the SAT-9 in
reading, math, and science. 
Admirably, Philadelphia developed one of the
most inclusive testing programs in the country.
The accountability system offered schools strong
incentives for increasing student participation in
the testing program. By including all students,
even those who were lowest performing and
those with learning difficulties and language
differences, the district risked lowering its overall
performance. The fact that test scores increased
in spite of this increased inclusion was a notable
achievement.
The introduction of the accountability system
launched a major cultural change in the district. It
focused everyone’s attention on student achieve-
ment and school improvement. It provided
incentives for school staff to seek out and adopt
innovations that they might have ignored or
resisted otherwise. And it initially satisfied
business, government, and civic leaders’ insis-
tence that the district make data about student
performance accessible to the public. 
But, the PRI had some serious flaws. The index
relied on a cross-sectional look at student
achievement, focusing on the performance
changes in specific grades rather than looking at
student growth year to year. Additionally, the PRI
relied on an off-the-shelf commercially-produced
test, the SAT-9, that was loosely aligned with
district standards in all subject areas. Using the
SAT-9 as the primary measure of student perform-
ance instead of looking at multiple measures of
student performance that were closely aligned to
the content standards undermined the PRI’s credi-
bility as a measure of student performance and
focused teachers’ attention on preparing students
for a standardized test rather than helping them
reach the standards.
And since the PRI did not take into account the
backgrounds of students or their entering level of
achievement, schools that had made substantial
improvement prior to 1996 found themselves at a
relative disadvantage compared to schools that
had made little progress prior to the introduction
of the accountability system. The schools in which
students were already making gains in learning
had to reach for even higher levels of perform-
ance after 1996 whereas schools with very low
performance in 1996 had improvement targets
that were more easily attained.
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Strategy Three: Accountability
"…many teachers believed that the Performance Responsibility Index
was unfair and held them accountable for factors outside of their
control… A greater effort by district officials to educate teachers and
the public about the PRI and to respond to their criticism may have
helped to build more confidence in the system."
A third and more serious problem had to do with
the metric used to determine student progress.
Students’ actual test scores were not used in the
PRI. Instead, students were placed in one of six
categories of performance (See Figure 4) based
on their scores and only movement from a lower
category to a higher one counted as a gain for
the school. It was the change in the distribution
of students in these categories that counted —
not the actual change in test scores. These
categories were arbitrarily defined and little was
known about the amount of learning needed to
advance from one level to the next or the relative
difficulty of moving a student from Below Basic 1
to Below Basic 2 versus moving from Basic to
Proficient. Experience in other locales such as
Kentucky suggests that these advances posed
quite different challenges and that students could
make significant gains but not advance into the
next category. Schools received no credit for the
increased learning of a student who advanced
from the lowest score in the Basic category to the
highest because actual test scores were not used
in calculating the PRI.
In addition, the index was complicated and not
easily understood by teachers, parents, or the
public. Some people were able to articulate the
components of the index, but the complicated
calculations used to create the final numbers
made even supporters of accountability skeptical
about the PRI’s accuracy, purpose, and impact. It
created a false precision that many educators
mistrusted. And their instinctive mistrust was well
founded. There was significant measurement
error in the indicators used. The increase on the
PRI required to reach the improvement targets set
for the schools were often smaller than the
amount of statistical error present in the calcula-
tions of the index. To put it simply, schools might
easily fail to reach their targets or surpass them
because of statistical flukes. This created a sense
of arbitrariness that is not acceptable in systems
that affect people’s lives and professional reputa-
tions. 
The calculation of the staff attendance factor in
the PRI was also perceived by many teachers as
punitive because long-term illnesses and mater-
nity leaves were treated as unacceptable absen-
teeism.
Philadelphia’s teachers were not opposed to
accountability. Teacher surveys indicated that 63
percent of teachers believed the PRI had the
potential to benefit students. However, many
teachers simultaneously believed that the PRI was
unfair and held them accountable for factors
outside of their control. They felt students’ lives
outside the classroom had more impact on
achievement than they did. A greater effort by
district officials to educate teachers and the
public about the PRI and to respond to their criti-
cisms may have helped to build more confidence
in the system and greater collective responsibility
for the results. The district did set up an
independent panel of experts chaired by Andrew
Porter of the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
This panel made numerous recommendations for
studying the PRI and improving it. While the
district was responsive, these changes came too
late to restore teacher confidence in a system
that had enormous influence on their work and
their reputations. 
There was also a disjuncture between reform
goals and the accountability timetable. The two-
year timeframe used by the PRI was too short for
schools to implement significant reforms in
curriculum and instruction. This added to the
frustration among teachers and principals who
were struggling to make improvements. Consider
what principals and teachers faced. They would
receive their PRI scores for the first year of the
two-year PRI cycle at the beginning of a school
year and they then had only seven months before
students would be tested again. Their budgets
were set; the summer professional development
was over, so there was little they could do if they
needed to make a large gain to reach their PRI
target except to directly prepare students for the
test. Test preparation was a rational response
under the circumstances, and it was the typical
response in Philadelphia.
Intensive qualitative research in a sample of
district schools identified schools that were
pursuing effective strategies for improving
instruction, but failed to reach their PRI targets.
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These schools were penalized even though they
were on observable, defensible paths to improve-
ment. The PRI underestimated the time needed
to bring about meaningful change and created
unrealistic expectations and burdens for staff.
Rather than creating school cultures that encour-
aged organizational learning and internal capacity
building, the PRI was a punitive measure that
highlighted school failures. Focusing on prepara-
tion for the tests was perceived as the only sure
way to avoid embarrassment and sanctions.
Only schools identified as making “low progress”
received feedback on the quality of their instruc-
tional efforts or were designated as needing the
School Support Process, a comprehensive inter-
vention that brought additional funds and assis-
tance to schools. Reviewing only those schools
that failed to meet their targets reinforced the
idea that feedback was a form of punishment and
that reflection and change were only necessary
when there was measurable failure. Rather than
promote a districtwide culture of continuous
progress, the PRI encouraged many educators to
seek quick fixes and adopt coping strategies. The
School Support Process could have been an aide
to improvement and did, in fact, help some
schools improve in real ways, but this process was
avoided rather than embraced because it was
seen as punitive and a symbol of failure.
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FIGURE 4. PERFORMANCE LEVELS ON THE SAT-9
Categories of 
Performance Definition
Advanced Superior performance beyond grade-level mastery.
Proficient Solid performance, meaning students are ready for the next grade.
Basic Partial mastery of the knowledge and skills that are fundamental for
satisfactory work.
Below Basic III Inadequate mastery.
Below Basic II Little mastery.
Below Basic I Very little mastery.
Source: T. Luhm, E. Foley, and T. Corcoran, The accountability system: Defining responsibility for student achievement.
Philadelphia: The Children Achieving Challenge, 1998.
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The designers of Children Achieving intended to
give principals and teachers more autonomy to
make decisions about curriculum and instruction.
This central tenet was articulated early on by
Hornbeck: “Those who sit closest to the action
are in the best position to decide what mix of
resources…will most effectively accomplish the
goal of raising student achievement.”7 The radical
decentralization proposed by the superintendent
seemed to be a significant operational change for
both central office and school staff who were
accustomed to a top-down, prescriptive district
culture. 
The reform architects established new structures
to give schools more authority over decision-
making. These new structures included clusters,
local school councils, and small learning commu-
nities. Newly established cluster offices working
with one comprehensive high school and its
feeder elementary and middle schools were
expected to provide focus for improvement initia-
tives in the schools, mobilize resources to support
improvement, build a responsive relationship with
neighborhood organizations and community
members, provide professional development,
coordinate social services, and strengthen K-12
curriculum, instruction, and assessment. Local
school councils were supposed to actively
engage parents in the decision-making of the
schools, moving them into more influential roles
than the ones usually offered by home and school
associations. Small learning communities, sub-
units of schools with typically fewer than 400
students across grade levels, were meant to
improve the conditions of teaching and learning
and to motivate teachers and students by
strengthening relationships and personalizing
schooling. 
Central Office
From the beginning, central office staff members
seemed unclear about how to operationalize
decentralization and ambivalent about how it
would impact their roles and responsibilities. The
Strategic Action Design stated that the new
functions of the central office were to “set
standards, assess progress, monitor for equity,
and act as a guide and provider of resources and
support,”8 but these tasks were complex and
challenging to a central office with limited
capacity. Central office staff struggled to figure
out how to be both “hands-off” and more helpful
to schools. They found the capacity-building role
to be in conflict with the core value of school
autonomy. Initially, some central office staff
members interpreted decentralization so literally
that almost every central office action proposed
became a topic of contention.9 There were exten-
sive debates about whether to develop a core
group of consultants to help the schools, whether
to organize the content standards by grade level,
how to define best practice, how to organize
professional development, and so on.
Decentralization posed challenges for those
charged with both making it happen and with
improving system performance. At times the two
goals seemed in conflict. (See Figure 5 for a
diagram of the core beliefs and values and their
effects on centralization and decentralization).
It also became increasingly apparent that decen-
tralization placed too heavy a burden on many
schools. School staffs were unready to assume so
much responsibility. Decentralization assumed
that school staff had the know-how and the
resources to improve student achievement, but
simply lacked the opportunity or authority to
make the decisions that mattered. But, in
Philadelphia, school staffs often did not have the
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Strategy Four: Decentralization
“Principals and teachers were told they had more authority and choice,
but they didn’t feel more empowered. The steady flow of mandates, in
fact, reduced their options. School leaders were overwhelmed by
mandates and felt Children Achieving was top-down and prescriptive.”
capacity to manage the new demands of decen-
tralization at the same time that they were trying
to make the changes in classroom practice
required by standards-based curriculum and
instruction. They were hampered by shortages of
time, resources, and direction. In addition, neither
central office nor school staffs had access to
professional development that might prepare
them to carry out their new responsibilities. The
central philosophy was clearly stated, but the
capacity to put it into practice often was lacking.
A turning point came in 1998 when reform
leaders viewed with dismay disaggregated district
test data that showed certain groups of students
were being left behind. For example, in 1998, the
four-year graduation rate was almost 30 points
lower for students in families on welfare than for
all students. Central office staff were concerned
that the reform’s equity objectives were being
neglected. These data convinced central office
personnel that they had to take a more prescrip-
tive approach. They concluded that they had to
send stronger messages to schools about what
and how to teach.10
Cluster Offices
The 22 clusters varied considerably in their
capacity to guide school improvement. Resource
inequities contributed to this variation. The first
six clusters formed in the 1995-1996 school year
received significantly more funding for several
years than the 16 created in the fall of 1996. The
rationale was that the original six were funded at
the level required to be effective and it was
important to demonstrate this to the state as part
of the district’s argument for increased funding. In
addition, the cluster leaders varied in their ability
to raise external funding. As a consequence, the
per-pupil expenditures for cluster staff and
services ranged from $81 to $475 in 1996-1997.
Clusters also varied considerably in size, staff
experience, demographic characteristics, and the
achievement levels of their student populations.
Clusters were expected to provide and broker
professional development through the Teaching
and Learning Network (TLN) which was part of
the Office of Leadership and Learning, the
professional development arm of the district. The
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FIGURE 5. DIAGRAM OF CORE BELIEFS AND VALUES AND
THEIR EFFECTS ON CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION IN THE
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA
TLN coordinators and facilitators were based in
cluster offices so that they could serve the needs
of schools and teachers. However, the district’s
ambivalence about decentralization was apparent
as TLN staff also reported to central administra-
tion. TLN staff were expected to offer workshops
to help teachers understand and implement the
reforms. In fact, much of their time was devoted
to communicating new policies and initiatives
mandated by central office, causing one TLN
coordinator to declare in 1999, “I’m not rolling
out one more reform. Enough is enough.” Over
time, TLN staff became somewhat more strategic
about allocating their time. In some clusters they
spent substantial time in elementary schools
focusing on early literacy initiatives, which
contributed to elementary school students’
achievement gains. In contrast, their work in
secondary schools was often spent orienting
teachers to the SAT-9, providing coaching on test
preparation materials and activities, and
supporting the many new and inexperienced
teachers.11
Differences in the abilities and strategies of the
cluster leaders led to variation in their clusters’
success at rallying schools to a common purpose
and providing services that met the needs of
schools’ staff, especially principals. About a third of
the cluster leaders defined their role as service
providers, supporting school initiatives. About half
defined their role more proactively, seeing
themselves as catalysts and mobilizers of reform. A
few saw their role as line officers in the district
bureaucracy, serving traditional administrative
functions. Indeed, central administrative leaders
generated confusing messages about the roles of
clusters and cluster leaders. One debate that
raged during the first years of Children Achieving
was whether cluster leaders ought to have rating
authority over principals. Initially, reform leaders
believed that rating authority would interfere with
cluster leaders’ ability to coach and mentor princi-
pals. But some cluster leaders were adamant that
they needed rating authority in order to exercise
the influence over principals they considered
necessary to accomplish school improvement.
When rating authority was granted, it reinforced
the message that the cluster was just another rung
in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Interview data
showed that school staff generally saw the cluster
office as just another form of centralized authority,
a way station in the top-down dissemination of
information and program mandates.
The most successful cluster leaders were able to
leverage funds and resources to provide more
professional development for teachers, more
technology, more instructional materials, and
even additional staff. They kept the focus on
instructional improvement and supported their
principals while acting as buffers between the
demands of the central office and the schools.
Professional development in these effective
clusters focused on improving instruction.
One particular cluster exemplifies how this combi-
nation of actions affected the progress of its
students. From the beginning of his tenure, the
cluster leader worked with principals to establish
an instructional priority for the cluster and to
target cluster staff and resources to support that
priority. The building administrators believed that
literacy ought to be the focus. They were willing
to turn back some of their school funds to the
cluster so that additional staff could be hired as
coaches for the cluster’s teachers. Cluster staff
members were chosen for their knowledge and
experience in early literacy and supported
adoption of a literature-based approach and a
strong phonics program in the schools. This
cluster’s success in teaching reading in the early
grades eventually captured the attention of
district leaders who subsequently adopted it as a
system-wide program of improvement.
Unfortunately, this was a rare instance of strate-
gies demonstrated as successful in one cluster
being replicated in the others. 
In general, most cluster offices lacked clear,
coherent strategies for instructional improvement
and the necessary resources and staffing. Many
cluster leaders were unable to leverage additional
funding and resources to augment the work of
principals and teachers. As new mandates were
rolled out by the central office, the cluster staff
became the enforcers of these mandates rather
than sources of support for implementing the
reforms. The work of the cluster offices was
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negatively affected by the sheer number and
scope of district initiatives and directives, by staff
turnover, by uneven and inadequate resources, by
the resistance of some teachers to change or to
participate in uncompensated professional devel-
opment, and by the low morale and turnover
among principals who felt ignored and maligned
by district and cluster leaders.12
Local School Councils
Local school councils built upon a school-based
management/shared decision-making initiative
launched by Hornbeck’s predecessor, Dr.
Constance Clayton, in the late 1980s. That effort
focused on giving more autonomy to principals
and teachers in budget and staffing decisions,
but it stalled due to resistance from both central
administration and the Philadelphia Federation of
Teachers (PFT).13 Under Children Achieving, local
school councils were intended to reinvigorate the
original initiative and take it one step further by
including parents as full partners in the reform.
Council members were supposed to make policy
decisions at the local school level including
decisions on the budget, external resources,
safety and security, and facilities management.14
Early in the reform, the PFT, however, objected to
the implementation of school councils as
proposed by the district and this resulted in a
joint PFT-District agreement that limited the juris-
diction of local school councils to discipline issues
such as suspension and expulsion and school
safety. In addition, the agreement changed the
council membership to require that teachers have
a majority instead of the proposed 50-50
membership. 
The district established a stiff criterion that 35
percent of all eligible households had to partici-
pate in the election of the parent representatives
in order for a school council to be certified and
have full authority. This was a formidable obstacle
for most schools and, in the end, many councils
were unable to obtain official certification. In
addition, the district set broad guidelines for
councils, but offered only limited training to
council members on how to carry them out. This
was a problem as most council members lacked
experience for their new roles. For many parents
unused to being active in schools, the new role
was especially challenging and intimidating. The
success of local school councils rested heavily on
the willingness and ability of principals to lead
and guide them, but school councils were threat-
ening to many teachers and principals since they
implied a new balance of power that was
unfamiliar and unsettling. The reform architects
underestimated the amount of support parents,
teachers, and principals needed to make strong
local school councils a reality. In the end, most
schools never formed certified local school
councils and only a few councils exercised signifi-
cant influence over their schools. 
Small Learning Communities
Like local school councils, SLCs were the exten-
sion of a previous reform effort. In 1988, the Pew
Charitable Trusts provided a $13 million grant for
the restructuring of neighborhood comprehensive
high schools into smaller units that would provide
more intimate environments for teaching and
learning. By the mid-1990s, this reform initiative
had stalled, but under Children Achieving, the
district gave it new life and mandated that all
schools — elementary, middle, and high schools
— be divided into SLCs. The focus of SLCs was to
be the improvement of teaching and learning,
although from the beginning there was consider-
able ambiguity about the authority of SLCs over
curriculum, scheduling, student assignment, and
other key decisions affecting teaching.
Analysis of CPRE/RFA survey data generated two
important findings about SLCs in elementary
schools: (1) well-implemented SLCs were
positively associated with a school climate
conducive to effective teaching, and (2) SLCs were
positively associated with teachers’ perceptions of
the strength of their professional community (a
measure of teacher collaboration and shared
responsibility for student learning). Because a
good school climate and strong professional
community were also associated with increases in
student achievement, these findings suggest that
SLCs made at least indirect contributions to
positive learning outcomes for young people.
Unfortunately, similar analyses could not be
conducted for middle and high schools. However,
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qualitative data collected in a sample of schools
indicates that SLCs contributed to safer, more
orderly school environments in secondary schools. 
Observations in classrooms and at small learning
community meetings and interviews with staff and
students indicate that the impact of SLCs on
school climate was stronger than on curriculum
and instruction. There were several reasons for
this. Having SLCs take responsibility for student
discipline contributed to a sense of greater order
and improved communication, but focusing on
these responsibilities too often overshadowed the
intended instructional purposes of these new
organizations. Student discipline often became
the primary responsibility of small learning
community coordinators, particularly in middle
and high schools. This meant that they had little
time to devote to instructional tasks. Second,
SLCs were required to adopt a thematic focus.
Hastily adopted and underdeveloped themes did
not produce rigorous curricula and the result was
often an emphasis on isolated events such as
assemblies and field trips. These activities
exposed students to a theme and built the
identity of the small learning community, but
diluted potentially powerful interdisciplinary
connections. Third, at the middle and secondary
school levels, the small learning community
coordinators could not be expected to lead or
judge the quality of teaching and curriculum work
in all of the core subjects. At best, they had
expertise in one subject. With the elimination of
departments, one or two teachers were left on
their own to develop curriculum in each subject
and they seldom received feedback on their
teaching from an observer qualified in their field.
In the middle schools where there were many
first- and second-year teachers, this lack of
subject-matter guidance contributed to a chaotic
teaching situation. Teachers at all levels reported
that they had more frequent informal discussions
about students with their small learning commu-
nity colleagues than they had had prior to the
creation of SLCs. This provided the opportunity
to design instruction to meet the individual
needs, abilities, and learning styles of students.
But these discussions typically focused on student
behavior and seldom developed into the system-
atic examinations of students’ work needed to
help students ratchet up their performance. 
Interviews conducted with teachers in the middle
and high schools and data from the Philadelphia
Education Longitudinal Study (PELS) revealed that
the creation of SLCs also generated new
inequities in some schools. When teachers were
permitted to form these communities voluntarily,
the result was often an inequitable distribution of
teacher talent across the SLCs. A related problem
arose from rostering students for most of their
classes in the SLCs which meant that not all
students had access to the full curriculum.
Teachers of specialized subjects such as foreign
languages, and higher mathematics and science
courses were not available to all students if those
teachers were assigned to a small learning
community. And data from PELS indicated that
students who had performed poorly in middle
schools were less likely to select their high school
small learning community which meant that they
were more frequently placed in the SLCs that
offered less rigorous curricula.15 In general, the
quality of curriculum offerings varied across the
SLCs and the elimination of subject-matter
departments meant that there were no forums for
quality control of curricula in the core subjects.
The stated purposes of SLCs were to strengthen
teaching and learning and create stronger bonds
and better understanding among teachers and
students, but SLCs were assigned many adminis-
trative and managerial functions. SLC coordinators
were asked to ensure compliance with mandates
and did not have the leadership, skills, knowledge,
time, or resources needed to help teachers make
deep changes in teaching and learning.
Developing strong SLCs required more time and
stronger incentives than were provided. SLCs
needed more budgetary authority and more
consistent and larger blocks of time to meet and
plan. Small learning community coordinators
needed help with discipline and administrative
functions so that they could devote time and
energy to instruction. And departments or subject-
matter networks were needed across SLCs to
guide curriculum development, provide quality
control, and ensure equal access to the curriculum.
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Clusters, local school councils, and SLCs were
intended to improve the quality of schools but
each ran into significant problems that prevented
it from being effective in the majority of schools.
Capacity, acceptance, and authority were the
common problems. There was also too little
professional development to prepare participants
to carry out their new roles. Principals, in partic-
ular, were ill prepared to work with local school
councils and SLCs. Accustomed to being in
charge, the vast majority of principals were
unable or unwilling to consult and collaborate
with teachers and parents. In addition, resources
were limited and the complicated and constant
flow of district mandates imposed enormous
burdens on those responsible for leading the new
structures. They struggled to meet the new
demands, often losing sight of their central
purpose in the process. Finally, uncertainty and
ambiguity surrounded the decentralization initia-
tives; there was insufficient specification of roles
and relationships and in the face of such confu-
sion, people often fell back on what was familiar
and comfortable. 
As district leaders retracted from decentralization
and began to give more direction to school staffs,
there was no articulation of a policy change. The
result was a disconnect between what was
actually happening and the rhetoric from the top.
In reality, as the reform progressed, schools lost
autonomy as new responsibilities and district
mandates piled up. They also were under tremen-
dous pressure to improve student achievement.
But district leaders continued to frame the reform
in terms of decentralization. Principals and
teachers were told they had more authority and
choice, but they didn’t feel more empowered.
The steady flow of mandates, in fact, reduced
their options. School leaders were overwhelmed
by mandates and felt Children Achieving was top-
down and prescriptive. The Philadelphia
experience does not clarify the ongoing debate
over the merits of centralized versus decentral-
ized strategies of school improvement or resolve
questions about what powers and responsibilities
should rest with the district and what should be
delegated with schools. In the end, Philadelphia
was a confused and muddled amalgam of the
two approaches. 
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Adopting standards-based curriculum, instruction,
and assessment measures requires deep changes
in teaching that experience and research suggest
only occur over extended periods of time and
with intensive support. Under Children Achieving,
there was a dramatic increase in professional
development opportunities for teachers and the
richness and depth of these opportunities
improved over the course of the reform.
Unfortunately, the vast majority of initial offerings
focused on compliance with mandates, and did
not provide teachers with the subject-matter
knowledge or curricular guidance they needed to
help their students meet the standards. An
exception was the professional development
offered by the Urban Systemic Initiative in mathe-
matics and science which will be discussed below.
As a consequence, these experiences had little
impact on classroom instruction. But later
programs, such as the district’s successful summer
content institutes, proved more effective in
helping teachers improve their instructional skills.
The content institutes built upon what had been
learned in the Urban Systemic Initiative and many
teachers reported that these professional devel-
opment programs deepened their understanding
of subject matter and led to changes in their
teaching. Professional development for other
staff, however, was quite limited. This was particu-
larly true for principals who faced new
responsibilities but were offered little support or
preparation.
The increase in professional development oppor-
tunities for teachers in Philadelphia was a
significant accomplishment. For years, profes-
sional development had been a low priority and
teachers typically attended a few sessions each
year that were usually unrelated to instruction.
Under Children Achieving expectations changed.
Teachers were expected to improve their practice
and the district was expected to offer programs
worthy of their time and attention. However,
Children Achieving had many components and
most required teachers to acquire new knowl-
edge and skills. The district initially spread its
professional development resources across these
initiatives and across the 22 clusters. The result
was a lot of activity but much of it was superficial,
providing information about mandates and proce-
dures rather than opportunities to examine and
improve classroom practice. 
Thus, in spite of the increase in professional
development opportunities, many teachers were
poorly prepared to implement standards-based
instruction and many held beliefs that ran
contrary to it. The professional development
opportunities should have provided teachers with
tools and instructional materials that were aligned
with the standards. In classrooms in which good
instruction was observed, the teachers were often
involved in sustained professional development
efforts and had access to high-quality curricular
materials. Many of these teachers were involved
with the Urban Systemic Initiative or with well-
designed literacy initiatives. In both cases, the
professional development was focused and
extended over time, and supported with good
curriculum materials. 
Ongoing, focused professional development is
hard to achieve without support and leadership
from principals. Yet few Philadelphia principals
saw themselves as instructional leaders or saw
professional development as part of their jobs
and the reform leaders did not seem to under-
stand how this limited the possibilities of
accomplishing the instructional changes they
were seeking. Instead of preparing principals to
be instructional leaders, central office staff just
demanded more of them. Nowhere in the
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Strategy Five: Leadership and Support  
for Teachers and Principals
“The lack of support and respect for principals was a serious weakness
in Children Achieving and contributed to its ultimate failure to bring
deep and lasting changes to the district’s classrooms.”
rhetoric or the design of Children Achieving was
the essential role of principals as site-based
instructional leaders recognized or developed.16
Principals felt disempowered and disrespected.
They received little or no professional develop-
ment to help them deal with their new
responsibilities and the demands from central
office staff. They were exposed to new pressures
from the public release of the PRI scores for their
schools. Public and civic leaders could see which
schools were “working” and which were not and
that burden fell heavily on principals. Morale was
low and the turnover rate high. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to sustain a reform agenda without
stable leadership in the schools. The lack of
support and respect for principals was a serious
weakness in Children Achieving and contributed
to its ultimate failure to bring deep and lasting
changes to the district’s classrooms. 
Central office staff itself struggled to manage the
implementation of the reforms and juggle the
demands of the 10-point plan. As Foley17 noted,
“Most of the Superintendent’s inner circle were
knowledgeable and thoughtful about standards-
based, systemic reform, but many other staff at
the central office did not have a clear under-
standing of these areas.” Shifting central office
personnel to the cluster offices meant fewer
people doing more work. Central staff turnover
was also high, and new people stepped in and
learned as they worked. Little attention was paid
to their development needs. 
Instead of building the capacity for principals,
cluster leaders, small learning community coordi-
nators, and central office staff, the leaders of
Children Achieving just kept asking them to do
more. They did not include school leaders in
planning and development and neglected devel-
opment of the workforce until it was too late to
make a difference. In the end, a demoralized
school leadership was disengaged from Children
Achieving, disenfranchised from the process, and
angry and resentful. 
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Children Achieving was intended to improve the
quality of support services available to students,
helping students and families gain access to a
broad range of community services, and coordi-
nating activities of service providers. The Children
Achieving reformers understood the negative
effects of poverty on children and on their capacity
to learn. As Hornbeck noted in 1994: “Community
services and supports can make the difference
between success and failure. Children who are
unhealthy, hungry, abused, ill-housed, ill-clothed,
or otherwise face the kinds of problems outside
the school born of poverty will not achieve at high
levels. Therefore it is imperative that initiatives be
dramatically expanded to provide the necessary
services and supports to reduce the impact of
these major barriers to learning.”18
However, resources were scarce and services limited
so district leaders focused on advocacy and coordi-
nation with community groups and government
agencies to broaden and deepen their impact. The
Family Resource Network (FRN) was the district
office assigned this responsibility.19 FRN staff did not
see themselves as direct service providers, but
rather as advocates, working with civic and commu-
nity agencies to coordinate youth and family
services. In addition, they were supposed to consoli-
date services within the district itself. The FRN
moved responsibility for student support services
from the central office to cluster offices by providing
each cluster with an FRN coordinator. 
In 1996-1997, the FRN identified four goals: to
improve student attendance, student health,
school safety, and family and community involve-
ment.20 While central office and cluster staff
understood how the FRN intended to accomplish
these goals, teachers and principals did not.
However, 92 percent of teachers expressed the
belief that the FRN could help their students.21
Communications about the role of the FRN and
responsibilities were inadequate and led to confu-
sion about its purpose. The FRN was not
designed to be responsive to the daily problems
that surfaced in schools, but rather to build
capacity in clusters and schools to make better
use of existing resources and to work with
community and civic organizations. 
Leaders of some community and civic organiza-
tions that worked with the FRN praised their
efforts. They felt they had a focused point of
contact within the district for the first time, but
others expressed wariness about working with a
district bureaucracy that seemed confused about
whether its role was delivery or coordination of
services. This role confusion about delivery versus
coordination was found within the FRN staff
themselves as they struggled to decide what
should be done by the district and what could be
handled best by outside agencies. 
The significant improvements in student atten-
dance seen in Philadelphia were partially due to
the efforts of the FRN, such as the installation of
truancy courts in schools to address chronic tardi-
ness and absence. There were also increases in
the numbers of students who received immuniza-
tions, health insurance, and eye examinations.
However, inadequate funding undermined the
work. Inadequate staffing and training limited the
effectiveness of the FRN as budget cuts forced
the elimination of many positions. This added to
the perceptions of teachers and principals that
they were not being supported in their work and
in areas, such as health and school safety, which
they believed critical to their ability to do their
jobs well. 
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Strategy Six: Better Coordination of Resources
“ Inadequate staffing and training limited the effectiveness of the 
Family Resource Network as budget cuts forced the elimination of many
positions. This added to the perceptions of teachers and principals that
they were not being supported in their work and in areas, such as
health and school safety, which they believed critical to their 
ability to do their jobs well.”
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Given the financial crisis threatening the district,
the architects of Children Achieving understood
that they needed the support of corporate and
civic leaders, community residents, and parents.
And initially, the Children Achieving reform plan
was championed by the business and foundation
communities, civic leaders, and the mayor. The
reform’s mandate to change all parts of the
system all at once made sense to them as they
were eager to get the job done. In addition,
public reporting of school-by-school test data and
data disaggregated by race/ethnicity and income
level helped Philadelphians understand the
gravity of the situation in their public schools.
Extensive media coverage and debate over the
design of Children Achieving and its new superin-
tendent made public education a front-page story
in a town where, as a grassroots leader described
it, “there had been apathy and little discussion.”22
However, interviews conducted with more than 40
of Philadelphia’s leaders revealed that, in fact,
they saw standards, accountability, and decentral-
ization as common sense ideas rather than as a
theory of education improvement that would
need ongoing assessment and revision. They also
held differing ideas about what was wrong with
the city’s public schools and competing interpre-
tations of whether Children Achieving produced
significant improvement in the schools.
Business leaders believed that the city’s economic
future rested on the quality of its schools and
many linked the city’s economic decline with
inadequate public schools. They judged the
school system inadequate because of its inability
to hold middle-class families in the city. When
Hornbeck approached Greater Philadelphia First,
a not-for-profit association of the Philadelphia
region’s largest employers, asking them to house
the Annenberg Children Achieving Challenge, its
board of directors agreed to take on the respon-
sibility, hoping it would give them greater
influence with district leaders. Over the course of
the reform, they were informed about the
progress of Children Achieving on a regular basis,
and some board members became personally
engaged and helped raise the matching dollars
required by the Annenberg Challenge grant. 
But economic circumstances changed and some
business leaders became disillusioned with the
reform approach and its leader, Superintendent
Hornbeck. Several factors contributed to the
decline in support from the business community.
First, because Annenberg Challenge funds were
used to build a district infrastructure to support
reform, Greater Philadelphia First leaders could
not point to specific ways in which the grant
funds made a difference in schools. They also
complained that they did not receive adequate or
accurate reporting from the district on how the
funds were spent. Some worried that too much of
the money was being spent on administration.
Additionally, some were frustrated by the failure
of reform leaders to outsource more of the
district’s service contracts to private companies.
All of these factors fueled their perception that
the district was inefficient and not a good steward
of public funds. A turning point in the relationship
between the superintendent and the business
community came in 1998, following the negotia-
tion of a new contract with the Philadelphia
Federation of Teachers. Business leaders felt that
Hornbeck failed to secure needed changes in the
teachers’ contract and that this seriously limited
the possibility of improving performance. They
began to doubt the effectiveness and potential of
Children Achieving.
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Strategy Seven: Civic and Parent Engagement 
“As district leaders became more adamant in their arguments for 
fair funding, supportive civic leaders, especially, were reluctant to voice
their concerns or raise questions. They feared giving ammunition to
political leaders who wanted to discredit the reform 
and the Superintendent.”
In the meantime, board leadership at Greater
Philadelphia First changed and the new leaders
took a more conservative stance. As local corpo-
rations (e.g., CoreStates Bank, Scott Paper,
SmithKline, and others) were taken over by
companies based outside of Philadelphia, the
commitment of corporate leaders to the well-
being of the city seemed more tentative. In
addition, Greater Philadelphia First expanded its
membership base to include regional corpora-
tions which meant that the organization
represented suburban as well as urban interests.
By June 2000, when Superintendent Hornbeck
resigned, only four of Greater Philadelphia First’s
founding 23 Chief Executive Officers remained.
The new leaders were strong supporters of the
Archdiocese system and were attracted to
Governor Ridge’s proposal for vouchers which
they believed would be good for business
because it might stem the flow of middle- and
working-class families from the city, thereby
buoying the local economy and strengthening the
quality of the workforce. They tried to persuade
Superintendent Hornbeck to work with the
governor on this issue, but he would not. In 1999,
members of Greater Philadelphia First stood with
the governor when he proposed a voucher plan
for the state.23 The message was clear: the
business community, once supportive of
Hornbeck’s initiative, had lost faith in the local
reform effort and lost confidence in its leader. 
Civic and grassroots leaders offered the strongest
praise for the Children Achieving reform plan.
They expressed pride and gratitude that
Philadelphia had a plan — something they felt
other cities lacked. Many saw economic inequality
and racial discrimination as the most significant
problems confronting schools (and the broader
society) and called for a redistribution of
resources that would provide students from
groups who had traditionally performed poorly
with better-designed and more intensive supports
to ensure their school success. They perceived
the city’s schools as just one of several key social
institutions failing poor children of color.
Hornbeck’s persistent fight for fair funding made
him a hero to these grassroots leaders even as
support for him crumbled in the business sector. 
When the reform seemed to falter as discontent
among principals and teachers became more
visible and test scores flattened, many civic
leaders began to feel that the plan needed
rethinking and modification. But it was difficult to
generate public dialogue about the reform’s
limitations or its accomplishments. It was difficult
to raise questions, offer a different perspective, or
mount an argument in the face of the compelling
logic of “We must change all levels of the system
at once.” One civic leader crystallized the
problem: “The completeness of his [Hornbeck’s]
vision wasn’t amenable to questioning. You
couldn’t tamper with any part of it.”24 The
centrality of Hornbeck also posed an obstacle to
open discussion and revision. Criticism of the
plan was tantamount to criticism of the superin-
tendent’s leadership. And finally, the larger
political and economic contexts played significant
roles in discouraging open dialogue about the
reforms. As district leaders became more
adamant in their arguments for fair funding,
supportive civic leaders, especially, were reluctant
to voice their concerns or raise questions. They
feared giving ammunition to political leaders who
wanted to discredit the reform and the
Superintendent. When it began to appear that
Children Achieving would not deliver the
sustained gains in achievement that its leaders
had promised, there was widespread disillusion-
ment. Many of the leaders we interviewed
expressed the feeling, “We’ve done the best and
the most that can be done, let the state take
over.”25
Parents were also viewed as partners in the
Children Achieving reform. Reform leaders
believed that parents were essential to their
success and parent involvement was a central
tenet of the reform design. To them, parental
involvement went beyond traditional roles, such
as being members of parent teacher organiza-
tions or attending school events. They wanted
parents to be part of school-based decision-
making teams and, together with teachers and
principals, direct school policies and manage
resources. The reformers also wanted parents to
become a political voice for additional funding
and assistance for Philadelphia schools. 
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While their vision seemed clear, they found it
difficult to carry out. Engaging urban parents in
the schools proved to be difficult. Overwhelmed
with trying to provide for their families, facing
long workdays, and feeling disenfranchisement
from civic life, parents faced severe obstacles to
getting involved. There were few precedents for
parents to serve as partners in school gover-
nance. Resources to educate parents and
community members about new expectations and
roles were limited. 
Some principals embraced and encouraged
parents to be partners, and parent involvement
increased. Too often, however, principals were
not prepared to engage parents in school leader-
ship roles and were threatened by their
involvement. As reported in a CPRE/RFA report
on parent involvement, “reformers did not take
into account how deeply unsettling shifting the
balance of power among schools, parents, and
community would be to many principals and
teachers. Reform planners underestimated what it
would take for schools, especially in low-income,
racially-isolated neighborhoods, to turn
themselves around and work with parents as
collaborators in school reform.”26
A few schools successfully worked with interme-
diary organizations to enable parents to identify
their concerns, raise controversial issues, work
through conflicts, and address issues that
impacted their children. But, these instances were
rare and were successful only when there was
strong leadership in the organization, the school,
or from a particular parent. Increasing parent
involvement was a worthwhile goal, but in
Philadelphia, the impact was marginal, and in the
end, had little influence on policymakers or
schools.
A reform of the magnitude of Children Achieving
required internal and external political support
that could be sustained for many years. Without
sustained and organized support, the voices of
critics tended to drown out those of supporters.
This was especially true after it became clear that
the improvements in student performance were
coming more slowly than an impatient public had
been led to expect. 
Philadelphia’s experience shows how difficult it is
to build resilient civic coalitions in the harsh
circumstances created by inadequate funding. It
reveals the problems that arise for reform leaders
as they try to communicate complicated
messages about standards, accountability, and
decentralization to civic and business leaders who
want “solutions.” It points out the importance of
setting expectations and preparing the public for
the kinds of gains that might be anticipated. 
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The Children Achieving Challenge was compre-
hensive in its scope and ambitious in its goals.
The 10-point plan was complicated and
sometimes difficult to understand. It placed a
high burden on school personnel. Each point had
multiple facets and they were not always
presented or rolled out in a coherent fashion.
Staff in many schools were overwhelmed and
confused by the various demands made on them
by the central office or clusters. Teachers faced
development of new curriculum in every subject
as well as new assessments, new work arrange-
ments and relationships, new demands for
professional development, new procedures for
obtaining services for students, new evaluation
procedures, and other changes. They were told
this had to be done “all at once.” What made
sense to administrators at the top was perceived
as “hell on the ground” by principals and
teachers. What seemed connected and aligned
on paper often was fragmented and out of sync
in practice. At the heart of the problem were
disjunctures between the philosophy and norms
about teaching and learning that were central to
Children Achieving and those held by most of the
district’s teaching staff. Little attention was given
to altering the views of teachers. Rather it was
assumed that they would see the wisdom of the
reform, embrace its tenets, and change their
behavior. 
Overloaded by the reforms, many school staffs
were unable to focus their efforts to improve.
They could not translate mandates into clearly
defined and manageable instructional priorities.
This resulted in widespread frustration among
teachers and principals. Principals especially felt
disempowered and disrespected as they received
one directive after another from the cluster
offices. To make matters worse, district leaders
seldom sought their input and the supports and
resources needed to get the job done were often
not available or arrived late. The “all at once”
theory also contributed to poor sequencing of
the reform initiatives since all tasks had the same
priority. For example, the accountability system
was in place several years before the curriculum
frameworks offered teachers guidance about the
kinds of curricular and instructional strategies that
would help students meet the standards.
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Strategy Eight: “All at Once”
“Overloaded by the reforms, many school staffs were unable to focus
their efforts to improve. They could not translate mandates into clearly
defined and manageable instructional priorities. This resulted in
widespread frustration among teachers and principals.”
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In one respect, the Philadelphia story is like a
Greek tragedy. A noble cause, a committed
leader, and a grand plan were undone by the
failure of the state and city to provide adequate
funding, by lack of understanding of what it takes
to change schools, by poor implementation, and
in some cases by the unwillingness of powerful
groups to work together on behalf of children.
In another sense, it is like a Russian novel.
Idealists sought to do too much, all at once. Well-
intended people who thought that by moving
quickly and broadly they would create a
groundswell of support for change instead met
with opposition and apathy. The reforms created
fatigue and resistance among teachers, and
disempowered principals. Initial support from the
business community evaporated and civic leaders
became exasperated with the intractability of the
reform plan and its leader. 
Children Achieving raised hopes in Philadelphia,
but left the city confused and anxious. Is there a
way to improve urban schools? What is it? There
are some important lessons to be drawn from
Children Achieving. They fall into two categories:
those that apply to almost all efforts to improve
teaching and learning, and those that are specific
to systemic approaches to reform. 
Remedial Lessons about Teaching and
Learning
Some of the lessons learned in Philadelphia have
already been “learned” from the experiences
with other reforms in other cities. Too often
reformers repeat the mistakes of others, failing to
learn from these previous experiences or from
research. This was true in Philadelphia. Among
these lessons are:
• Content standards and accountability
measures offer a foundation for instructional
change, but produce results only if teachers
are provided the time and support necessary
to develop high-quality curricula and to alter
their classroom methods. For many teachers
in Philadelphia, closing the gaps between the
pre-reform curriculum, their own content
knowledge, and their beliefs about what their
students can learn, and the new standards set
under Children Achieving was a difficult task.
Given the severe time pressures set by the
accountability system and the inadequate
guidance and support provided for them,
many opted for drilling students for the test.
Achieving the deeper changes in classroom
practice and the rigorous curriculum that the
architects of the new standards had
envisioned would have required more
guidance, demonstration proofs, richer
learning opportunities, much more time, and
greater understanding and sensitivity to the
daily challenges of teaching urban class-
rooms. 
• Curriculum-based, sustained professional
development is essential to instructional
change. Providing teachers with high-quality
opportunities to master content and
pedagogy, model curriculum units, and
ongoing support from accomplished teachers
produces results.
• The effects of teacher hiring practices,
teacher retention, and teacher transfers on
the distribution of teacher talent and the
capacity of schools to make improvements
must be addressed. Incentives are needed to
recruit and retain new teachers, especially in
the middle grades, and policies are needed
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Lessons Learned
"The reforms created fatigue and resistance among teachers, and
disempowered principals. Initial support from the business community
evaporated and civic leaders became exasperated with the intractability
of the reform plan and its leader. Children Achieving raised hopes in
Philadelphia, but left the city confused and anxious."
to encourage master teachers to practice in
the most challenging schools.
• Too much reform can overload the schools
and teachers. Focus on a few things. Do them
well and demonstrate that better results are
possible. Stay focused, be persistent, and
build demand for the next set of changes.
Pilot new approaches to demonstrate that
they are effective. As teachers see improve-
ments in one area, as they come to believe
that students can do the work, they will be
more willing and better equipped to take on
the next challenge.
• Different strategies are needed for high
schools. One can’t hold high school staffs
accountable for meeting high standards when
students are arriving in ninth grade lacking
skills essential to academic success. Districts
need a catch-up strategy and they need to
prepare high school staffs to implement it.
• Win over the teachers. You should not blame
them for social ills they didn’t create or
accuse them of not caring or working hard
just because test scores are low. Ultimately,
success depends on their commitment and
their sense of personal accountability. 
• Prepare staff at all levels of the system for the
new roles and responsibilities called for in the
reforms. Structural changes demand that
people behave in new ways and they need
support in learning the new behaviors.
• Early intervention to help children acquire the
language skills needed for success in school is
critical. Full-day kindergarten appears to have
positively impacted student progress in
Philadelphia, and concentrating on language
arts in the early elementary years may have
had the most impact on student performance.
However, the city of Philadelphia failed to
respond to the district’s efforts to expand and
improve early childhood programs. The
superintendent offered a plan but it was
rebuffed by other city agencies. Questions of
who was in charge apparently took prece-
dence over increasing children’s access to
good programs. As a consequence, an oppor-
tunity to lay a solid foundation for the
improvement of the public schools was
missed. 
New Lessons about Systemic Reform
A first lesson about systemic reform concerns the
trade-offs between alignment and autonomy.
Children Achieving had at least one serious
design flaw. As described in the literature,
systemic reform assumes well-aligned accounta-
bility and assessment systems and school control
and development of curriculum. The idea is that a
central authority (a state or, in Philadelphia’s case,
the central office) sets content and performance
standards and holds schools accountable, but in
turn the schools are granted the opportunity to
develop means of reaching the standards. In the
theory, this includes control over their curriculum.
What we believe to be a basic flaw in this theory
is that well-aligned accountability and assessment
systems either presume or lead to a fairly uniform
curriculum. If a central authority wants to hold
schools accountable for what students learn, its
assessment system must test what teachers teach
or to put it another way, teachers must know what
will be tested and it is likely that this is what they
will teach. Therefore, in such a scenario,
individual schools and teachers do not determine
their own curriculum. They teach a curriculum
determined by the standards and assessments. A
well-aligned system is not tolerant of multiple
curricula, developed by individual teachers and
schools.
The School District of Philadelphia lived out this
contradiction as they worked to implement
Children Achieving. Initially, central office staff
focused on decentralizing authority to schools
and giving school staff the opportunity to make
their own decisions. They set standards and
established an accountability mechanism that
included incentives for schools to improve their
performance. They were criticized because the
district test did not perfectly align with the
standards, so they worked to improve the align-
ment. Results from testing and other measures,
however, continually pointed out wide disparities
in outcomes and opportunities to learn for low-
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income students, students of color, and English
language learners so the central office sought to
even the playing field. As the Hornbeck adminis-
tration came to an end, central office staff and
the Board of Education were developing tests in
every subject area for grades 7-12 in order to
clearly signal to teachers what to teach. Only a
year after Hornbeck left, the central office was
working on a districtwide curriculum — in
response to teacher demand. The shift from the
promise of autonomy to a common curriculum
was dramatic.
Ironically, throughout the reform effort, personnel
in the field perceived most actions of the central
office as mandates, even their efforts to decen-
tralize authority. Because the decision to
decentralize was made centrally, and related
policies were designed with little consultation
with the field, school and cluster personnel
experienced decentralization as a set of central
office mandates, rather than opportunities for
school autonomy. And there was little evidence
that the schools were ready and eager to take
control of curriculum in Philadelphia. Teachers
consistently called for more specific guidelines
about what and how to teach.
Philadelphia’s leaders equated school autonomy
with control over curriculum. One need not
presume the other. School districts considering
systemic reform efforts might grant schools
control over other aspects of their operation —
budgets, staffing, and professional development,
for example — while maintaining a centralized
curriculum. Alternatively, school districts could
develop a curriculum that covered some propor-
tion of the school year, leaving schools and
teachers free to determine how to use the
remaining time. Districtwide assessments would
focus on the mandated curriculum.
A second lesson to be drawn about systemic
reform is about standards, how they become
ubiquitous, and how they can undermine the
increased autonomy that they are supposed to
provide to schools and teachers. Under Children
Achieving, one of the functions of the central
office was to set standards. As the central office
staff recognized the need to provide schools with
more guidance about how to carry out the
reforms, they drew on their authority to set
standards to provide it. In addition to content and
performance standards, the central office staff
defined “process” standards that spelled out
acceptable practice in a variety of areas. They set
standards for local school councils, small learning
communities, professional development, teaching
practice, project learning, service learning, the
comprehensive support process, and so on. The
standards were perceived by central office staff as
a benign form of guidance, and as being different
from mandates. The label, in their view, implied
advocacy for quality rather than an exercise of
authority and control.
However, to school staff, these “process”
standards were just prescriptions in another form.
And as cluster and central office staff used these
various sets of standards to determine whether
schools were complying with the reforms, they
clearly were viewed as regulatory mandates.
Calling them standards did not change the fact
that they felt like regulations to the school staffs.
Other districts can learn from this experience. If
the idea of standards is to define an ideal state of
affairs, then deviation should be expected, and
permitted, across contexts. This is especially true
of “process” standards. In a decentralized
environment, the central office could acknowl-
edge that deviations are expected, maybe even
encourage them, and focus on the results rather
than on compliance. Or they could define param-
eters of acceptable behavior and the conditions
under which deviations would be permitted. It is
probably important to distinguish between
standards and regulations. The former imply
some professional legitimacy, some basis in
knowledge or experience, while the latter are
simply the operationalization of policies that may
or may not have such grounding.
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A combination of factors contributed to Children
Achieving’s failure to produce sustained improve-
ments and deep changes in practice. These
included: flaws in the theory of action itself, flaws
in implementation, lack of capacity and lack of
attention to building it, and behavior inconsistent
with the beliefs and values underlying the reform
effort.27
Reformers encouraged business, civic, and grass-
roots leaders and parents to believe that
standards, accountability, and decentralization
would bring improvements in student perform-
ance. As achievement data showed that these
strategies were inadequate, they did not help
business and civic leaders understand that the
plan needed to be revised. There was not an
understanding in the community that the reform
plan was a living document and modifications
based on experience were essential to its
ultimate success. 
As Christman noted, “…the selling of systemic
reform as comprehensive common sense and as a
package that ‘all had to be done at once,’
undercut the possibility for the input and accom-
modations necessary for building alliances for
reform. It discouraged critical questions, reflec-
tion, and revision — all necessary for
organizational learning.”28 Without strong support
from stakeholders, systemic reform is hard to
sustain: progress is too slow, and communities
too impatient. 
Central office celebratory rhetoric further eroded
support from civic, political, and business leaders
as they struggled to understand the discordance
between the claims of district leadership, the
complaints of teachers, and the continuing reality
of low student achievement scores. In the end,
the complexity of the design coupled with inade-
quate resources and support and a failure to win
support from teachers combined to bring
Children Achieving to an end. This is not to say
that nothing was accomplished. The reform raised
expectations for Philadelphia’s children, made
public the grim reality of the conditions in the
schools, forced a discussion among citizens about
the future of public education in Philadelphia,
and pressured the state into action to change the
political and legal structure of public education in
the city. The elementary schools did show signifi-
cant gains in student performance and the
introduction of full-day kindergarten and early
literacy programs ensured that the city’s children
would have additional support as they began
their school careers. But in the end, the high
hopes that greeted this ambitious reform were
not fulfilled.
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In Conclusion
"The reform raised expectations for Philadelphia’s children, made public
the grim reality of the conditions in the schools, forced a discussion
among citizens about the future of public education in Philadelphia and
pressured the state into action to change the political and legal
structure of public education in the city…But in the end, the high hopes
that greeted this ambitious reform were not fulfilled."
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Appendix A 
Additional Reading on Children Achieving
The following following publications on the evaluation of Children Achieving are currently available through
CPRE at (215) 573-0700, or email your requests to cpre@gse.upenn.edu. Copies can also be downloaded
at http://www.cpre.org/Research/Research_Project_Children_Achieving.htm.
The following publications on the evaluation of Children Achieving are available exclusively from CPRE’s
web site at http://www.cpre.org/Research/Research_Project_Children_Achieving.htm.
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1. 1996-2000 school-level data on indicators
that made up the District’s Performance
Responsibility Index including student scores
on the SAT-9, student promotion and gradua-
tion rates, student attendance, and teacher
attendance.
2. Two census surveys of teachers, the first in
1997 and the second in 1999. Teachers were
asked about reform implementation, school
conditions, and teaching practices. There was
a greater than 60 percent response rate on
both surveys.
3. School indicators describing teacher and
student characteristics in 1996 and 1999
obtained from the School District of
Philadelphia’s Information Services. These
data included school enrollment, number of
teachers, the proportion of students quali-
fying for free or reduced-price lunch, among
other indicators. These data were used for
descriptive purposes and in hierarchical linear
and logistic regression models to help under-
stand the relationships among reform
implementation, student outcomes, and
school characteristics. 
4. Five years (1995-1996 through 1999-2000) of
qualitative research in 49 schools (26 elemen-
tary, 11 middle, and 12 high schools) in 14
clusters. Qualitative research included: inter-
views of teachers, principals, parents, outside
partners who worked in the schools, and in a
few cases, students; observations of class-
rooms, small learning communities meetings,
professional development sessions, and
school leadership team meetings; review of
school documents (School Improvement Plan,
budget, etc.); and intensive, multi-year case
study research in a subset of 25 schools (13
elementary, 5 middle, and 7 high schools).
5. Interviews of central office and cluster staff
and observations of meetings and other
events.
6. Interviews of 40 Philadelphia civic leaders
(including political leaders, leaders in the
funding community, public education
advocates, journalists, and business leaders). 
Appendix B
Children Achieving Evaluation Research Methods
In 1996, the Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE) at the University of Pennsylvania and
its partner, Research for Action (RFA), were charged by the Children Achieving Challenge with the
evaluation of Children Achieving. Between the 1995-1996 and 2000-2001 school years, CPRE and RFA
researchers interviewed hundreds of teachers, principals, parents, students, District officials, and civic
leaders; sat in on meetings where the plan was designed, debated, and revised; observed its imple-
mentation in classrooms and schools; conducted two system-wide surveys of teachers; and carried out
independent analyses of the District’s test results and other indicators of system performance. An
outline of the research methods used by CPRE and RFA follows. 
In addition, numerous other studies conducted during Children Achieving informed this evaluation.
These included: Bruce Wilson and Dick Corbett’s three-year interview study of middle school students;
an evaluation of the Philadelphia Urban Systemic Initiative in Mathematics and Science conducted by
Research for Action; the Philadelphia Education Longitudinal Study conducted by Frank Furstenberg
at the University of Pennsylvania; and the evaluation of the William Penn Foundation’s initiative in two
clusters, conducted by the National Center for Restructuring Education, Schools, and Teaching.
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Consortium for Policy Research in Education
The Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE) unites five of the
nation's leading research institutions to improve elementary and secondary
education through research on policy, finance, school reform, and school
governance. Members of CPRE are the University of Pennsylvania, Harvard
University, Stanford University, the University of Michigan, and the University
of Wisconsin-Madison.
CPRE studies alternative approaches to education reform in order to
determine how state and local policies can promote student learning.
Currently, CPRE's work is focusing on accountability policies, efforts to build
capacity at various levels within the education system, methods of allocating
resources and compensating teachers, and governance changes like charters
and mayoral takeover. The results of this research are shared with
policymakers, educators, and other interested individuals and organizations
in order to promote improvements in policy design and implementation. 
Research for Action
Research for Action (RFA) is a Philadelphia-based nonprofit organization
engaged in educational research and reform. Founded in 1992, RFA works
with educators, students, parents, and community members to improve
educational opportunities and outcomes for all students. RFA work falls
along a continuum of highly participatory research to more traditional policy
studies that use qualitative methods and case study analysis. RFA also seeks
to inform the national dialogue about strong schools and effective education
through reports and journal articles, conference presentations, videos, and
collaboration with other school reform groups. 
Nondiscrimination Statement
The University of Pennsylvania values diversity and seeks talented students,
faculty, and staff from diverse backgrounds. The University of Pennsylvania
does not discriminate on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, religion,
color, national or ethnic origin, age, disability, or status as a Vietnam Era
Veteran or disabled veteran in the administration of educational policies,
programs, or activities; admissions policies, scholarships, or loan awards;
and athletic or University administered programs or employment. Questions
or complaints regarding this policy should be directed to Executive Director,
Office of Affirmative Action, 1133 Blockley Hall, Philadelphia, PA 
19104-6021 or (215) 898-6993 (Voice) or (215) 898-7803 (TDD).
Consortium for Policy Research in Education
Graduate School of Education
University of Pennsylvania
3440 Market Street, Suite 560
Philadelphia, PA 19104-3325
Telephone 215.573.0700
Fax 215.573.7914
www.cpre.org
Research for Action
International House
3701 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
Telephone 215.823.2500
Fax 215.823.2510
www.researchforaction.org
